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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN NEIL BREINHOLT,
Plaintiff and
Appellee,

s

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

j

vs.
JAN E. BREINHOLT,

:
:

Defendant and
Appellant.

Case No.

940395 - CA

:
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final
judgments entered in domestic cases by the District Courts for the
State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2), and Rule 3
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON REPLY
This matter presents two reply issues on appeal. They are as
follows:
1.

The

plaintiff

applied

the

incorrect

standard

for

appellate review.
2.

The

applicable

appellate

standard

is

view

for

correctness.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes and case citations are determinative of
the issues presented in this appeal.
1.

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5.

2.

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(4)(a) and (b), (1993).

3.

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(2), (1993).

4.

Crompton v. Crompton, 255 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).

5.

Haumont v. HaumontP
1990).

6.

Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d
1991).

7.

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

8.

Rasband v. Rasband 752 P.2d
1988).

793 P2d. 421
1209,

1331

(Utah Ct. App.
(Utah Ct. App.

(Utah Ct. App.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order and Decree of Divorce
entered by the Seventh District Court, in and for Carbon County,
State of Utah, June 14, 1994. The parties were married in 1977 and
separated in November, 1992.

They have two children from this

union.
The parties opened a music store in Price, Utah in 1985. This
was the parties' only source of income from 1985 to 1992. In 1992,
Mr.

Breinholt

obtained

a

second

job

as

the

Commissioner with an annual salary of $21,000.

Carbon

County

Ms. Jan Breinholt

worked for two (2) years at minimum wage at a finance company.

She

obtained a better job with a local coal mining company in 1979.
Her salary was approximately $1,200 per month, gross.

She left

that employment in 1981 to give birth to the parties' first child.
Ultimately, Mr. Breinholt left his job with a local cement
company in 1985 to open the family music store.
2

At that time Mr.

Breinholt was earning $42,000 per year plus a company car,
Jan Breinholt also worked in the family music store from 1985
to late 1988. She discontinued going to the store to give birth to
the parties second child.

Jan did not return to the store or the

work force thereafter.
The store was consistently profitable throughout the parties7
ownership.

Profitable enough that the family's assets grew from

only equity in the home, a $7,000 boat, and $6,700 in savings to
approximately $360,000.
The parties ultimately separated in November, 1992.

Mr.

Breinholt filed for divorce in July, 1993, and a trial was held on
March 7, April 14 and 15, 1994.

The primary issues contested

consisted of child support amounts, alimony, and the valuation of
the parties7 music store.

Much of the dispute centered on the

personal expenses being paid from the business funds. The focus of
the personal expenses paid by the business was determinative of the
three (3) central issues before the trial court.

First, the

valuation of the music store, second, the available money from Mr.
Breinholt's one full time self-employed job for child support, and
third, the total available income from all sources to determine
alimony.
Course of the Proceedings
Trial was commenced on March 7, 1994, but discontinued due to
a family emergency for counsel. The matter was rescheduled for two
days on April 14 and 15, 1994.
3

Each party testified and presented their respective experts to
review the expenses paid by the business and determine the value of
the music store.

Each party personally testified regarding their

respective income and expenses.
The trial court thereafter took the matter under advisement
and entered a Memorandum Decision one week later. The trial court
divided the marital assets totalling in excess of $360,000, set
alimony and child support awards based upon Mr. Breinholt's job in
the family store, and determined the family business had a value of
$100,000.
The trial court directed plaintiff's counsel to prepare
Findings of Fact and the Decree of Divorce.
Objections to the proposed pleadings.

The defendant filed

The trial court largely

overruled Jan's request to enter dollar values for the parties7
return on investment, personal expenses paid from the business, and
a total of all available income to the parties during the course of
the marriage.
Trial Court Disposition
The lower court thereafter entered the proposed Findings and
Decree with relative minor interlineation provided by the court.
The Decree was signed on June 10, 1994, and entered on June 14,
1994.

The defendant then filed her Notice of Appeal on July 8,

1994.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts are thoroughly set forth in Appellant's
Brief at pp. 5-11.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiff misidentifies the appropriate standard of
appellate review. The plaintiff's entire rebuttal is premised upon
this misapplication of the standard for review.

Therefore, the

plaintiff's analysis is fatally flawed.
The trial court erred by adopting it own "sweat of the brow"
doctrine and not applying the factors dictated in Jones v. Jones
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

In fact, the criteria established by

Jones id. and Rasband v. Rasband 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
would require remand to the trial court to equitably adjust the
parties' respective standards of living to more similarly represent
the standards acquired during the marriage.
In summary, Mr. Brienholt's discretionary funds from the
family business permits him a radically higher standard of living
than that which is left over for Jan and their two children.
POINT I
MR. BREINHOLT SUPPLIES THE WRONG STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
Mr. Breinholt's rebuttal to the claimed errors of the trial
court are all hinged upon an erroneous standard for appellate
review. Mr. Brienholt's arguments are conditioned upon this issue.
Ms. Jan Brienholt has repeatedly asserted the appropriate
standard to review is for correctness with no special deference to
5

the

trial

court.

The

litigants7

split

of

opinion

on the

appropriate standard hinges upon what is considered a "finding of
fact" versus a "conclusion of law".
Jan has consistently requested the trial court and this court
to review the totality of the parties' income available to them
during the course of the marriage. The trial court rejected Jan's
objections to the Findings and stated,
3.
In setting alimony, the court considered only the
income that each party may be expected to earn "by the sweat
of the brow". Since marital assets were divided equally, and
neither party has substantial non-marital property, investment
or "unearned" income is presumed to be equal, insubstantial in
comparison with "earned" income, and excluded from the alimony
calculations.
4.
Utah Law is clear that the court should consider
only the income from the equivalent of one full-time job in
setting child support, Section 78-45-7.5(2), Utah Code (1993).
This court believes the policy behind that rule applies with
even greater force in consideration of alimony. [Emphasis
Added].
(See, Appellant's

Addendum

p.33,

[Ruling

on Defendant's

Objections, pp. 2-3])
The doctrine of "by the sweat of the brow" is repeated
verbatim in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as a
specific finding.
(See, Appellant's Addendum, p.30, [Findings, f 18]). This policy
statement by the trial court that child support laws "applies with
even greater force in consideration of alimony" also appears in the
Findings of Fact. (See. Appellant's Addendum, p.30, [Findings, f
19]).
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Public policy considerations and statutory analysis that
supports a trial court's decisions are "conclusions,"

These are

not facts derived from the evidence submitted to the trial court.
Therefore, nothing requires special deference to the trial court's
interpretation of policy or statutory application.
It is simply illogical to assume a trier of fact, has special
insight into public policy or statutory interpretation.

It is

appropriate for the trier of fact to have special deference
regarding
factual

credibility, persuasion, and
disputes

between

the

determinations

litigants.

Disputed

of the
legal

interpretation must be initially resolved by the trial court
however, obtains no special deference on appellate review.
Such is the status of the case at bar.

Jan objected to the

trial courts application of the child support standards to the
determinations regarding alimony. (See, Appellant's Addendum p.32,
[Objections to Findings, fl7(c)]).

This is a conclusion of law.

Although plaintiff was directed to draft the final order, simply
labeling a conclusion of law as a factual determination does not
limit appellate review.
In summary, all of Neil's rebuttal is hinged upon this court
applying an inappropriate standard of review.

Whereas Neil's

premise is false, his underlying analysis is fatally flawed.
POINT II
THE APPLICABLE APPELLATE STANDARD IS VIEW FOR CORRECTNESS.
As cited in Appellant's Brief, the appropriate standard for
7

reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law are cited in Howell
v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

"Conclusions of

law, however, are reviewed for correctness and given no special
deference on appeal. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah
1989); Smith v. Smith. 793, P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)."

With the appropriate standard in mind, the trial court's
statements

in ff

3 and

inappropriate factors.

4 Ruling

on Objections

applies two

First, the trial court applied an uncited

quotation "by the sweat of the brow".

This error is more fully

discussed in Appellant's original brief and will not be repeated
herein.

(See, Appellant's Brief, pp 13-15)

The second incorrect factor is the exclusion of the "unearned
income" from consideration in alimony.

In Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d

1072, (Utah 1985) (See, Reply Brief Addendum) the Utah Supreme
Court specifically stated the ability of the husband to provide
support to the wife must be considered by the trial court. In that
case, the parties were married just less than thirty (30) years.
The husband established a retail pharmacy store and the wife worked
in minor clerical jobs in the early years of the marriage.

Her

primary occupation during the marriage was raising the children.
In reviewing the case, the Utah Supreme Court recapped the
terms of the Divorce Decree.
Under the terms of the decree, the husband received Riverton
Drug, including the land, building, and balance sheet assets,
a condominium he had purchased subsequent to the parties'
separation, together with its furnishings, a country club
membership, and all interest in a time-share condominium in
8

Mazatlan. The wife received the family home with its
furnishings, a country club membership, a 1980 automobile, and
several securities. In addition to the specific items of
property, the wife was awarded $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in
attorney fees, and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years,
$750 for five additional years, and $500 thereafter.
700 P. 2d at 1073.
As in the case at bar, the husband in Jones exclusively
controlled the finances of the retail business. He elected to pay
himself $45,000 per year and reinvest the remaining capital in the
business.

The Supreme Court then notes,

The full profit produced by the business, adjusted by the
court to take into account legitimate and reasonable needs of
the business for additional capital, should have been used as
the basis for assessing the husband's ability to provide for
his spouse. In making this analysis, the trial court should
not permit all claims of need for capital on the part of the
business to take precedence over the support needs of the
wife. If these capital needs are a result of discretionary
decisions of the husband to expand and improve the business,
rather than to maintain it in its present condition, then to
permit him to divert income into the business at the expense
of his ex-spouse's support needs would be to permit him to
enrich himself at her expense. (Emphasis Added)
700 P. 2d at 1076.
To fulfil the requirements of Jones, the trial court must
review unearned income (return on investment) or other similar
capital resources in determining the payor's ability to provide
support to his wife.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court improperly
excluded from consideration unearned income.

The trial court

compounded the error by refusing to consider all the sources of
capital available to the husband.
9

By failing to consider the

factors required in Jones, id. and applying the trial court's newly
created doctrine "by the sweat of the brow", the trial court
committed reversible error.
Had the lower court correctly considered the factors outlined
in Jones id., the alimony award would have substantially equalized
the parties's standard of living developed during their marriage.
In Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) the
Utah Court of Appeals reiterated the factors established in Jones,
id.

The Court of Appeals stated,
An alimony award should, to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards
and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones. 700
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
The Court of Appeals then reviewed the findings available to

them in Rasband.

Again the husband was self-employed while the

primary pursuit of the wife was a homemaker. The appellate review
of the findings are also similar to the case at bar and therefore
the Rasband findings are outlined at length.
Their assets consisted of the insurance business, a large
home, vehicles and personal property, all acquired through
joint efforts. He contributed his income and labor; although
Mrs. Rasband has average typing skills, she primarily
contributed her unpaid labor. Her homemaking and child-rearing
efforts advanced his career pursuits. Both parties are
functioning adults with health problems not untypical of
persons nearing fifty years of age. The trial court found that
Mr. Rasband's net monthly earnings (after business expenses
but before taxes) were $3,800 and that his needs were $1,500
per month, "including payment of the family debts." Mrs.
Rasband's needs were specifically found to be between $1,250
and $1,400 per month. These findings have not been challenged
on appeal.
10

The Court of Appeals in Rasbandf id. was critical of the
similarly vague findings as in the case at bar.

The Court of

Appeals noted,
The trial court made only one vague, conclusory finding
regarding Mrs. Rasband's present and future ability to produce
a sufficient income to meet her needs, i.e., that she is
"capable of meaningful employment in the future.11 It is this
finding that apparently formed the basis for the court's
determination of the amount and the nonpermanence of the
alimony awarded. However, as the Utah Supreme Court has
recently pointed out,
[t]he findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree "follows logically from, and is
supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P. 2d
423, 426 (Utah 1986). The findings "should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached."
752 P.2d at 1334
The Court of Appeals in Rasband id. then compared the similar
facts of Jones id.
Although Mr. Rasband does not have the amount of discretionary
income Mr. Jones did, the award herein leaves Mr. Rasband with
some discretionary income and Mrs. Rasband with none. The
lower court found $45,000 of disposable income. He needs
$18,000 annually and she needs $16,800, for a total of
$34,800. This leaves him with $10,000 annual discretionary
income, in addition to the advantage he enjoys by being able
to expense some personal living expenses through the business.
These facts appear to warrant permanent alimony in a monthly
amount greater than $800. (Emphasis Added)
Under these circumstances, the amount of nonpermanent,
declining alimony awarded to Carol Rasband creates a situation
comparable to the meager award in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d
379 (Utah 1983), and the non-award in Canning v. Canningr 744
P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987). When this is coupled with the lack
of adequate findings regarding her current and future ability
to produce an income that — together with alimony — will
meet her monthly need of $1,250-$1,400, the trial court's
award is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
11

The addendum to Jan's initial brief includes the total tax
return for the parties in 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993.
addendum,

omits

employment.

the

depreciation

deductions

Plaintiff's

from

his

self-

In fact, from 1990 through 1992, the business took

depreciation for both parties vehicles and a boat.

The boat was

purchased in 1989 replacing the family boat acquired before he
became self-employed. The depreciation for these items was $9,179
in 1991, and $7,225 in 1992.
Therefore including these family vehicles and recreation
equipment on Neil's Schedule "C" in 1991 the total business profit
is over $47,000. In 1992 the total business profit is over $48,000
when depreciation on the boat and personal vehicles is added back.
The total monthly award the trial court made to Jan was $461
for child support, $500 for alimony, $500 of imputed earned income
when she could go to work "in the next few years" and undescribed
unearned income of $500.

This totals $1,961 for the support of

herself and two children.
The standard of living the court awarded Neil was $21,000 from
his commission job, plus $36,000 from the business employment, plus
the discretionary personal expenses, such as depreciation of his
boat.
As an aside, Mr. Brienholt admits that even during the
separation, he placed $10,000 in the parties savings account in
1993 that did not have to be used during that year for any personal
or business related expenses. (Tr. 316) During the same period he
12

was paying for Jan's auto insurance, health insurance, made IRA
contributions to each of the retirements in addition to paying
support.
The discretionary funds identified in Rasband and Jones, is
equally analogous to the Breinholt's.

Even after paying $13,000

per year in the current child support and alimony payments, Mr.
Breinholt has gross income of $43,000 per year.

Jan and the two

children have a standard of living of less than $24,000 per year.
However, this assumes she will receive $6,000 of wages although she
is not in the work force. In fact the disparity is $18,000 for Jan
and $43,000 for Neil.
In

fact,

the

evidence

of

Mr.

Brienholt's

own

expert

established the family business had a cash flow of $60,700.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29). This is in addition to his $21,000 a
year commission job.

Therefore the standards of living for the

respective parties are inequitably desperate.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has inappropriately argued from a false premise
regarding the standard of appellate review.

The appropriate

standard to review the lower court is based upon whether it applied
the factors outlined in Jones id. or applied its own conclusions
from other statutes and doctrines.

When reviewing the lower

court's conclusions of law, the Court of Appeals is not required to
provide any deference to the legal conclusions drawn below.

13

An appropriate application of the law requires the lower
court's decision be reversed and remanded with instructions to
consider all the available resources for alimony and equalize the
parties7 post divorce standards of livinc

^L. G. CUTLER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, by first class mail,
postage prepaid on this LJ

day of May, 1995, to Ms. Joane Pappas

White, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, at 475 East Main Street,
Price, Utah 84501.

L. G. CUTLER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

1072

Utah

700 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Because Erickson made no effort at any
time to procure a buyer for either piece of
equipment and had approved the sale of the
shear on the day set forth in the notice for
less than was eventually obtained, we cannot find that he was prejudiced by either
the technical defects in the notice or the
slight delay in the sale. In fact, since he
acquiesced to the lower bid, the delay actually worked to his advantage by lessening
the deficiency by $2,000. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the notice
was reasonable.
The deficiency judgment entered by the
lower court against Erickson is therefore
affirmed. In light of the facts that the
leases involved in this matter provided for
an award of attorney fees to Scharf in any
action necessary to enforce the leases and
the trial court awarded them to her in
connection with the proceedings below, we
remand the case for determination of reasonable fees in connection with this appeal
as well. Management Services Corp. v.
Development Associates, .Utah, 617 P.2d
406, 409 (1980).
JLALL, CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

DeMar D. JONES, Plaintiff
and Respondent.
v.
Harriet H. JONES, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 18733.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 17, 1985.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Raymond S. Uno, J., entered de-

cree of divorce, divided marital assets, and
determined alimony. Wife appealed the
property division and alimony award. The
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that:
(1) Supreme Court could not determine
whether trial court distributed marital assets equitably; (2) trial court abused its
discretion in fixing monthly alimony award
to wife at $1,000 for five years, $750 for
five additional years, and $500 thereafter;
and (3) how husband chose to allocate profits between himself and his business was
not binding on court in determining husband's ability to pay alimony.
Remanded.

1. Divorce ®=*253(4)
Supreme Court could not determine
from the record whether trial court equitably distributed property in divorce proceeding and trial court's statement that property distribution was "fair and equitable"
was insufficient finding where trial court
provided no findings of fact that fixed values of marital assets.
2. Divorce <&=>253(4)
In divorce proceeding, when one of the
parties to a property distribution raises a
serious question as to value of one or more
of the marital assets, trial court's distribution of those assets should be based upon
written findings of fact that will permit
appellate review.
3. Divorce <3=>286(1)
Wife waived claim that distribution of
marital assets was inequitable where wife's
attorney prepared the inadequate findings
of fact regarding marital asset values and
where wife's attorney made no motion to
have trial court amend the findings to include values.
4. Divorce <s=>237
In fixing a reasonable alimony award,
court should consider the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the ability of
the wife to produce a sufficient income for
herself, and the ability of the husband to
provide support.

JONES v. JONES

Utah

1073

Cite as 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

The parties were married on December
5. Divorce <©=*240(4)
Alimony award to wife allowing her 13, 1952. They separated during May of
monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years, 1980, and their divorce decree was entered
$750 for five additional years, and $500 on June 14, 1982. During the course of the
thereafter was insufficient where, other marriage, the couple raised four children,
than assets awarded to her in property built a 4,000-square-foot home in Sandy,
distribution, wife had no assets and no Utah, and established a retail pharmacy
outside income, where husband and wife business, Riverton Drug, which was the
had formerly enjoyed a very comfortable primary income-producing asset of the marlife style, where wife was awarded no in- riage. The husband is a licensed pharmacome-producing assets, where wife was ob- cist. During the early years of the marligated to make mortgage payments of riage, the wife worked in minor clerical
nearly $700 per month on residence, where jobs. However, after the family began to
wife would be unable to maintain anything grow, she worked only intermittently,
like the standard of living she enjoyed during usually at the pharmacy or the associated
marriage, where wife was 52 years old and gift shop. Her primary occupation during
had no professional training and few market- the marriage was raising the children, alable skills, and where husband was in an though she also volunteered considerable
excellent position to provide adequate con- time to a variety of social service organizations.
tinuing support to wife.
6. Divorce <s=>237
How husband chose to allocate profit
from his business between himself and the
business was not binding on court in determining husband's ability to pay alimony; full profit produced by the business,
adjusted for legitimate and reasonable
needs of the business for additional capital,
should have been used by trial court as
basis for assessing husband's ability to provide alimony; trial court should not permit
claims of need for capital on the part of the
business to take precedence over support
needs of wife.
B.L. Dart, John D. Parken, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant
Glenn Richman, Salt Lake City plaintiff
and respondent
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant appeals from the property distribution and alimony provisions of a decree of divorce, contending that she was
not given an appropriate share of the marital assets and that the alimony award is
insufficient We affirm the property division, but reverse the alimony award and
remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

After a day-long trial, the trial court
issued a memorandum opinion awarding
the parties a divorce and describing the
property to be awarded to each. Shortly
thereafter, the wife's counsel submitted
findings of fact, which were approved by
the trial court. The findings consisted of
nothing more than statements taken from
the court's memorandum opinion setting
out the property division and reciting that
it was "fair and equitable." Neither the
memorandum decision nor the findings assigned individual values to each of the assets or a total value to the cumulative
share being awarded to each party. Under
the terms of the decree, the husband received Riverton Drug, including the land,
building, and balance sheet assets, a condominium he had purchased subsequent to
the parties' separation, together with its
furnishings, a country club membership,
and all interest in a time-share condominium in Mazatlan. The wife received the
family home with its furnishings, a country
club membership, a 1980 automobile, and
several securities. In addition to the specific items of property, the wife was awarded $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in attorney fees,
and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five
years, $750 for five additional years, and
$500 thereafter. The wife challenges both
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the property distribution and alimony provisions of the decree.
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court
may make such orders concerning property
distribution and alimony as are equitable.
U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). The trial
court has broad latitude in such matters,
and orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed.
See e.g., Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d
379, 382 (1983); Dority v. Dority, Utah,
645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English v. English,
Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). However,
the trial court must exercise its discretion
in accordance with the standards that have
been set by this Court. In the present
case, we find that the trial court did not
comply with those standards. We therefore reverse and remand, but only as to the
alimony issue.
We address first the property distribution. The wife argues that the trial court
awarded her such a small portion of the
marital assets as to make the entire distribution inequitable. Ordinarily, we would
assess the merit of such an assertion by
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact
and the values it assigned to the various
items of property included in the distribution. However, in the present case there
are no findings of fact that fix these values. In an attempt to compensate for the
trial court's failure to make such findings,
we have reviewed the record to determine
whether the values were apparent from the
evidence. However, that examination reveals that the valuation of the most important assets was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial court accepted one set of
values, the wife was clearly awarded too
little; if another set was adopted, it is
possible that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.
[1,2] On the present record, we cannot
determine whether the trial court distributed the property equitably. In re Marriage
of Martin, 22 Wash.App. 295, 588 P.2d
1235, 1236 (1979). To avoid problems of
this nature, we require that when one of
the parties to a property distribution raises
a serious question as to the value of one or

more of the assets, the trial court's distribution of those assets should be based
upon written findings of fact that will permit appellate review. Cf. Chandler v.
West, Utah, 610 P.2d 1299,1301 (1980).
Counsel for the wife contends that the
matter should be remanded to the trial
court for entry of the required findings.
The husband contends that such a remand
is unnecessary. He relies on Pearson v.
Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 (1977), for
the proposition that the trial court need
only make generalized findings of fact to
support its judgment and that the trial
court's statement that the distribution was
"fair and equitable" is a sufficient finding
to sustain the judgment.
The husband misreads Pearson. There
the court entered a decree dividing the
marital property pursuant to a general formula stipulated to by the parties. Appellant asserted that the court failed to make
detailed findings of fact showing that the
distribution was in accord with the stipulation. We held that the discretion conferred
on the trial court by section 30-3-5 of the
Code could not be controlled by a stipulation of the parties and that the trial court's
general and rather conclusory findings of
fact were sufficient to support the property
distribution. Id. at 1082. However, we
specifically observed that the Pearson appellant did not claim that the ultimate distribution was inequitable. That fact was
critical to the affirmance. In contrast, the
gravamen of the wife's claim here is that
the distribution was inequitable. To determine whether equity was done, we must
have before us specific findings on the
facts pertinent to that issue.
[3] Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for
findings on the specific value of the assets.
In this case, however, the wife's attorney
prepared the inadequate findings of fact
she challenges on appeal and the conclusions of law and decree of divorce, all of
which the court entered without alteration.
Counsel for the wife made no motion to
have the trial court amend the findings to
include values. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b).
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The wife cannot come now, albeit through
new counsel, and complain of her own failure to include specific property values in
the findings of fact. She has waived the
claim.
The wife's second claim is that the trial
court abused its discretion in making the
alimony award, considering both the length
of the marriage and the present financial
resources of the parties. We agree.
[4,5] This Court has described the purpose of alimony: "[T]he m o s t important
function of alimony is to provide support
for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. English,/
565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in
mind, the Court in English articulated
three factors that must be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of
the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide
support
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted). See also
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 144,
147 (1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615
P.2d 1218, 1223 (1980). Nowhere in the
trial court's memorandum decision, its findings of fact, or its statements made on the
record at the conclusion of the hearing is
there any indication that the court analyzed
the circumstances of the parties jn light of
these three factors. And our attempt to
perform this analysis through a review of
the record evidence compels us to conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in
fixing the alimony award.
As noted, the first factor to be considered is the financial condition and needs
of the wife. Other than the assets awarded her in the property distribution, the wife
has no assets and no outside income. As a
result of the success of Riverton Drug, the
couple had enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle. Jn the property settlement, the wife
was awarded no income-producing assets.
She was awarded $10,000 in cash and sev-

eral securities of relatively small value and
limited liquidity. She now must make
mortgage payments of nearly $700 per
month on the residence, wholly apart from
ordinary and necessary expenses of food,
clothing, and transportation. Assuming
that she sells the house and uses the equity
to purchase more modest accommodations,
it is almost certain that she will be unable
to maintain anything even approaching the
standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage, given the $1,000 per month alimony awarded by the trial court for the
first five years and the decreased amounts
awarded for the following years.
The second factor to be considered is the
wife's ability to produce a sufficient income
for herself. She was married at the age of
23 and was 52 years old at the time of trial.
The paid work she did in the early years of
the marriage and the miscellaneous functions she performed at the pharmacy and
gift shop were all relatively unskilled in
nature. During most of the marriage, with
the full consent and support of her husband, she devoted her time to raising their
four children and donating her services to
various social service organizations. She
has no professional training and few marketable skills. The husband managed the
finances of both the family and the business and provided his wife with an allowance to cover her expenses. When Riverton Drug was finally incorporated, the
stock was issued entirely in the husband's
name. The wife has no independent income. It is entirely unrealistic to assume
that a woman in her mid-50's with no substantial work experience or training will be
able to enter the job market and support
herself in anything even resembling the
style in which the couple had been living.
See Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 379,
381 (1983).
The final factor to be considered is the
ability of the husband to provide support to
the wife. The record shows that although
the husband paid himself an annual $45,000
from the proceeds of Riverton Drug, the
total profits from the business actually
amounted to almost $90,000 per year.
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While the trial court apparently viewed
$45,000 as the husband's total annual income for purposes of determining alimony,
in fact he had control over the entire profit,
but chose to take only half of it as personal
income and to set the rest aside for reinvestment in the business.
[6] The apportionment of income between personal and business uses is quite
properly a matter left to the discretion of
the husband as owner of the pharmacy and
gift shop. However, how he chooses to
allocate that profit is not binding on the
court in determining his ability to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The full profit produced by the business, adjusted by the
court to take into account legitimate and
reasonable needs of the business for additional capital, should have been used as the
basis for assessing the husband's ability to
provide for his spouse. In making this
analysis, the trial court should not permit
all claims of need for capital on the part of
the business to take precedence over the
support needs of the wife. If these capital
needs are a result of discretionary decisions of the husband to expand and improve the business, rather than to maintain
it in its present condition, then to permit
him to divert income into the business at
the expense of his ex-spouse's support
needs would be to permit him to enrich
himself at her expense. Cf. Christiansen
v. Christiansen, Utah, 667 P.2d 592, 594
(1983).
On the record, there is no reason to
surmise that the income generated by the
business will decrease in the future. The
husband, therefore, as sole owner, is in an
excellent position to provide adequate continuing support to his ex-spouse.
The foregoing analysis leads inexorably
to the conclusion that the trial court's alimony award was inequitable, both in terms
of the initial amount and the graduated
diminution over time. The wife is in her
mid-50's, possesses few marketable job
skills, and has little hope of retraining.
This is simply not the sort of situation in
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony
award is appropriate. The husband oper-

ates a financially successful business, built
up over the course of the marriage through
the joint efforts of both the husband and
the wife. These facts clearly call for some
form of continuing spousal maintenance.
The original award must be more substantial, considering the husband's real discretionary income, and should continue at that
level for the foreseeable future.
We remand for further findings consistent with this opinion. The trial court, of
course, will retain continuing jurisdiction
over the matter and may modify the decree
on petition of a complaining ex-spouse if
the circumstances should change in the future. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (Supp.1983).
HALL, C J., and STEWART, HOWE, and
DURHAM, JJ. concur.

STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF
CLATTERBUCK, Nick Alan.
No. 19937.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 18, 1985.
Juvenile charged with criminal homicide and first-degree murder was certified
by the Third Juvenile District Court, Utah
County, Leslie D. Brown, J., for trial as an
adult. The 15-year-old juvenile appealed
certification order. The Supremje Court,
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) statute empowering juvenile court to certify juvenile
for trial as an adult provides a substantive
standard for certification; (2) even though
statute empowering juvenile court to certify juvenile for trial as adult does not specify burden of proof that State must meet to
justify certification, statute does not violate
due process; (3) juvenile court's failure to
expressly state standard of proof that

